Abstract: Causation as an element of a criminal offence is different from the probative difficulties. The empirical laws that are relevant to the proof of causation, as a pure matter of fact, are not discussed here, but only causality as a category of our understanding and a general law of the intelligible world. This general law of causality is equally valid for all result crimes (e.g. homicide, bodily harm, deception offences and criminal damage). According to the European continental theory of conditions, any conditio sine qua non is by itself a cause. Causation is established by the formula of conditio (similar to the socalled 'but for' test in the common law), which corresponds to a counterfactual reasoning. However, that formula is not able to resolve adequately those cases of causal overdetermination where the result occurred by means of actions of multiple, independently intervening agents. A semantic model of the world evolution, based upon ramified temporal logic, may assist the comprehension of causal connections between human actions and the relevant results. At the end of the day, this model allows us to understand that, even in situations where no kind of factual uncertainty is present, doubts upon the attribution of causation to specific agents remain. We shall conclude that the attribution of causation is not a natural problem, but a logico-legal one, that has to be dealt with by way of logico-legal criteria. Nevertheless, attribution of causation must be clearly distinguished from objective imputation of proscribed harm.
4 body. Therefore, we will not treat the empirical laws of causation that are relevant to the determination of, for instance, the lethality of the injuries inflicted on a victim of a homicide. Instead, we will treat causality as a category of understanding and general law of the intelligible world. That general law of causality is equally valid for all types of result crimes (homicide, bodily harm, deception offences and criminal damage).
The formula of conditio
According to the theory of conditions, any fact without which the result would not have occurred is a condition, which is moreover equivalent to any other condition, and is valid singularly as cause, exactly like any other condition.
The determination of a causal nexus between a basic action α (carried out by agent i) in a moment t 0 , and the occurrence of an event A, in a moment t 1 , implies the following two aspects (which are considered jointly as 'formula of conditio'): i) A factual verification that at the present moment (the instant of which is supposed to be ulterior to t 1 ) and according to available information, it can be said that A took place at t 1 and that basic action α was executed by agent i at t 0 ; ii) A hypothetical counterfactual reasoning, that is, an operation that consists of mentally eliminating the basic action α, which apparently has conditioned the event A that occurred at t 1 , in order to reveal if, when absent, the event would not have happened, in the same instant.
In case of positive response to i) and ii) it is demonstrated that α was a conditio sine qua non of A at t 1 .
Yet in the case of positive response to i) and negative response to ii) -that is, the mental elimination of the basic action α would not prevent the occurrence of event A at t 1 -the conditio is not confirmed. This alone does not demonstrate the lack of causal efficacy of the basic action α with regard to the occurrence of event A at t 1 . We may indeed face situations of causal overdetermination, wherein another cause -be it virtual or concurrent -would have been sufficient to provoce the occurrence of event A at t 1 , in the absence of the basic action α. In these situations, we must optimize the formula of the conditio, otherwise we may not be able to demonstrate the causal efficacy of basic action α. That, in its turn, would hinder the responsibility of the accused for the completed crime, leaving only the possibility to convict the defendant for attempt, in case of intention, or nothing at all, in case of negligence 5 .
We will use |(α,i,t 0 )  (A,t 1 )| to abbreviate the assertion that there is a causal nexus between the action α, carried out by agent i, in the moment t 0 , and the truth of A in the moment t 1 (where A is a sentence, like 'j is dead', describing the effects of the occurrence of an event , the 'death of j' in such case), where it is assumed that such causal nexus is determined according to the previous theory.
A semantic model of the world evolution

A model of the particular case 6
The purpose is not to define a new logic 6 , nor to establish formal deductive mechanisms that can be applied to the analysis of actions, results and cause-and-effect nexus. Our intention is simply to define a semantic model that -accompanied as it is by the habitual informal reasoning made by legal practitioners (suggested on the one hand by their own common sense and, on the other hand, by the previous comprehension of the legal problem) -may allow for a systematization of reasoning necessary for establishing a causal nexus, according to the underlying theory. should be referred for fairness sake. We may also remind some first-order temporal logics, so-called fluid and event-based. Or some modal logics where an operator sees to it is included in order to establish a relationship between the action of a person and the change in the state of affairs, but without an explicit reference to the particular executed action: for example, cf. Stig Kanger, Law and Logic, 38 THEORIA 105-132 (1972) Systems, pp. 194-215 (Springer, Wien/New York, 1996) .
Our model can thus be no more than a model of the particular case, which we can furthermore designate as pragmatic. However, it must be based upon an abstract formal semantic model for representation of the evolution of the world, completely independent of any particular case. Subsequently, we start with the presentation of the abstract model and set out to discuss briefly its potentialities for incorporation of modal temporal
The proposed abstract model may be considered an oversimplification of the reality, but we think that it captures the features that we think are fundamental for the analysis of these types of cases by the legal practitioners 8 .
Time structure in the model of world evolution
In accordance with our intuition, the world exists in time and is made up of change, in view both of actions accomplished by multiple agents (persons) and of ocurrences of other events 9 (which we can characterize as nature interventions). Therefore the state of the world may vary from one instant to the other. 
The tree of world evolution
Thus we may see the models as tree-like structures, where at each moment the past is linear and there exist open future branches.
t+2
Although time is continuous, we may assume that we only have report of what (relevant) has happened, that has changed the state of affairs, in a discrete set of points or moments in time. So, for pratical purposes, we may consider a discrete time, isomorphic to the set of the integer numbers. Moreover, although we may assume that time is infinite (both with respect to the past and to the future), for our case analysis we only need to report part of the relevant tree structure, and, in particular, we may consider that it starts, i.e. that the tree has a root, at the moment t 0 where it took place t t+1 the action α, carried out by agent i, whose consequences we want to analyse. Typically, we will refer such instant as instant 0.
We may see a history (or a trajectory) as a complete branch in the tree and we will identify each moment with reference to the history to which it belongs and to its instant:
we will use h(t) to represent the moment in history h at instant t. Since a same moment may belong to different stories, the truth of some assertions, like assertions about the future, will depend not only of the moment we are considering, but also of the history (to which it belongs) that we assume that will be followed. However, the truth value of simple atomic assertions about the state of affairs will depend only on the moment under consideration. Thus we could describe that some assertion A was true or false at some moment m=h(t) by adding to such moment m, in the tree, the label, respectively, A and ¬A (where ¬ denotes the logical symbol for negation, i.e. ¬A means 'not A'). However, not to make a graphical representation of trees too heavy, we choose not to include that information in the tree and describe it in the text.
On the other hand, as we have referred, the bifurcation of two stories at a moment m has to do with the execution of actions carried out by one or more agents, or with ocurrences of other events, which we can characterize as nature interventions. When analyzing our cases, the transition from one moment to the next (on a history) may be labelled with pairs of the form (α,i): this will mean that (although other actions might have occurred simultaneously) for practical purposes we may consider that such transition was caused by the execution of the action α by the agent i (if action α was carried out by a joint act of two agents i and j, then we can use (α,{i,j}) as label).
Finally, informally, we will use the label ¬(α,i) to indicate that agent i has not performed action α: in such transition, the agent i has performed actions different from α, and actions that are not relevant to the analysis of the truth of the atomic assertions that describe the states of affairs under consideration (and, for that reason, we do not need specify which was the specific action that agent i has performed). We hope that this and other issues about our model will be clarified by the examples next. 
Tree of the world evolution:
Current trajectory:
It is implicitly assumed that the current trajectory is h1, i.e. h1 is the trajectory actually followed.
Available information:
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The present trajectory (h1) is known and there is account on which basic actions were actually accomplished, as described in the tree.
There is also the following information about the state of affairs at moment h1 (0) (that is the same moment as h2(0), h3(0), ..., h8(0)):
(where ∧ denotes the logical symbol for conjunction, i.e. ∧ means 'and'). That is, at the initial moment under consideration Mr X is not dead, and there is a glass of excellent port wine.
Translated to the natural language, the question is as follows: may the death of Mr X, which was observed at instant 4, have been caused by the fact that John introduced 6 mg of poison into the glass of port, at instant 0?
In order to answer to this question, the procedure is to see if the mental elimination of the execution of the action p6 by the agent j would prevent the occurrence of the death of Mr X, which was observed at instant 4.
The relevant alternative trajectory is obtained supposing that, at the initial moment, the agent j does not carry out action p6, performing, instead, other actions not relevant for the case, and that all the other agents act as they did in the current trajectory.
The relevant alternative trajectory is h5.
According to the intuitive assumptions about the effects of the present actions we may conclude that the evolution of the state of affairs in the world would be the following on this alternative trajectory.
Moment h5 (0) (9) (Basic action: Mr X drank the port wine and it is assumed that it was not beneficial to his health, but he did not die)
CONCLUSION: Mr X would not have died. The conclusion that the death of Mr X by intoxication was conditioned (= caused) by John's action comes necessarily to mind.
In other words, a positive answer is given to the question if
In natural language, the question goes like this: may the death of Mr X, observed at instant 4, have been caused by the fact that Anthony dropped 3 mg of poison into the glass of port, at instant 1?
The relevant alternative trajectory is now h3.
The relevant elements are now the following: 
In natural language, the question is: may the death of Mr X, observed at instant 4, have been caused by the fact that Francis dropped 6 mg of poison into the glass of port, at instant 2?
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The relevant alternative trajectory is h2.
The relevant elements are:
(Basic action: Francis did not drop poison into the glass of port) (9) (Basic action: Mr X drank of the port wine, however it is expected that he did not die)
CONCLUSION: Mr X would not have died. Thus the conclusion that his death by intoxication was caused by the basic action of Francis seems reasonable.
John and Francis both caused Mr X's death, but we cannot assert that Anthony caused it too (even though we know empirically that the percentage of poison he added to the glass of port has interacted with the others while producing the victim's death through intoxication).
It is therefore clear that (i) in a situation that does not bear any kind of factual uncertainty, and (ii) where all the agents in fact contributed, by means of their respective actions, to the occurrence of Mr X's death, even so (iii) the attribution or not of causation to each of them will be different, not withstanding (iv) each of them having added a certain amount of poison that solely would not have been sufficient to produce the victim's death. In fact, (i, ii) the cause of Mr X's death on the present trajectory h1
(i.e., the actually followed trajectory) is perfectly identified, that is, a portion of 15 mg of poison contained in the glass of port. In the same way, (ii) the doses of poison administered by each of the agents are also identified. So it is known, in this context, (i, ii) what caused the death of Mr X, based upon our knowledge of the empirical laws of causation. We know, too, (iii) who caused his death, by applying the positive formula of conditio, which is here illustrated in form of our tree of world evolution. The positive formula of conditio thereby fulfils the function of allowing (iii) the attribution of causation to each of the agents, according to the relative differences between several individual contributions. These differences are in fact relevant and not arbitrary, in spite of (iv) each of the agents having added a percentage of poison to the glass of port that by itself would not be sufficient for the causation of the victim's death. We may also say that the positive formula of the conditio is able to disclose one aspect of causality as a category of understanding, which long after that would be seconded by the philosopher Mackie by his definition of cause with the inus condition 12 . That is, an action is cause if it constitutes an insufficient, but not redundant part of a causal sequence as a whole. Now the basic action of John and Francis, taken one by one, are inus conditions for Mr X's death, but this is not the case with Anthony's basic action, which was a merely redundant part in the causal sequence.
As for result crimes, the attribution or not of causation to an agent allows the judge to proceed to an immediate distinction of cases of potential responsibility for a completed crime in relation to those where there is not more than responsibility for an attempt. In the present case, Anthony can at most be held responsible for attempt, since it is not possible to attribute the cause of Mr X's death to him.
But does this mean that the logical consequence of the fact that John and Francis have caused individually the victim's death is that they should be punished individually, one apart from the other, for being the immediate and individual perpetrators of the homicide?
This would be the case if 'killing a person' meant the same than 'cause the death of a person', be it intentionally, recklessly or negligently. However, a blind causation is nothing more than the insurmountable limit of imputation of a result to an agent.
In the legal framework of German origin the attribution of a cause to a specific agent is followed by the verification of criteria according to the so-called theory of objective discuss words, but even though it should be pointed out that these English expressions are not well chosen, as they induce to think that we are still treating with problems of causation in law, while in reality we are already dealing with the capacity to control the events, which allows us to consider the result as an agent's deed. We are not talking about a strong control of the events, in the sense of an equivalence between the materialization of the agent's forecast and his will (crime is not an artistic production);
it is a weak control we are talking about, in so far as it was within the agent's possibility to avoid the result. Why is a weak control of the events sufficient? Because the law does not make strict requirements to the persons on this level, it only demands that they hold back from harming others, what can be done with the minimum effort as to not create dangerous situations.
Since the criminal responsibility of each of the agents is being assessed, and no concerted effort between the two has happened -rather, there is parallel authorship with lack of knowledge of the reciprocal actions -, the statement that both contributed to the production of the result would not have any practical significance, because certainly to none of them the responsibility for the other's action can be imputed. 
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independently of the others, again added 9 mg of the same poison. Mr X drank the port, and died consequently.
The agents are as in the first version, and the meaning of the basic actions (now p3, p9 and D) and of the atomic assertions is similar to those in the first version.
If we applied the usual heuristic (i.e., the formula of conditio) in this version of the 'case of the glass of port', we would encounter a total impossibility of drawing conclusion wether there exists a causal link between each of the mentioned basic actions, considered separately, and the death through poisoning of Mr X (it is worthwhile to remember, though, that this is not the same as declare the absence of empirical causation between the doses of poison and the victim's death).
But let us have a closer look if there is any possibility for a causal attribution of Mr X's death on the actually followed trajectory to any or some of the agents.
Our strategy to face the problem without abandoning the formula of conditio consists in considering possible sets of basic actions, in order to discover which should be the smallest of these sets that still is capable of clarifying Mr X's death, which was concretely observed.
The |set of basic actions of the three agents| is evidently cause of the death of Mr X, since the victim would not have died if these three actions had not been executed. Thus the set {(p9,j),(p3,a),(p9,f)} explains the occurrence of Mr X's death.
Let us look now for the possible minimal sets of basic actions still capable of explaining causally the specific death of Mr X. In other words, our purpose is to discover which are the smallest subsets of {(p9,j),(p3,a),(p9,f)} that still explain the occurrence of that death.
Let us think of subset {(p9,j),(p3,a)}: if we consider an alternative trajectory where none of these basic actions was accomplished, with only (p9,f) occurring (i.e. trajectory h7), we have that Mr X would not have died in that instant. Therefore we have a subset that explains the occurrence of Mr X's death.
Similarly the subset {(p3,a),(p9,f)} explains the occurrence of Mr X's death.
And the subset {(p9,j),(p9,f)} also explains the death of Mr X.
If we were searching now for subsets of these subsets, then we would return to the usual circumstances of the application of the formula of conditio, and we would conclude again that no particular subset of basic actions (i.e., constituted by only one basic action) is able to explain the occurrence of Mr X's death.
With this in mind, we find that the smallest sets of basic actions capable of explaining causally the death of Mr X are the following: {(p9,j),(p3,a)}, {(p3,a),(p9,f)} and {(p9,j),(p9,f)}.
What shall we do now? One thing is sure: it cannot be concluded that any of the basic actions by itself alone could explain the death of Mr X, nor can any of the basic actions be completely excluded from having caused Mr X's death.
The attribution of causation should thus be made with reference to each of the agents.
The distinctions, if existing, only may be established on the level of objective imputation of the result.
c) The case of the glass of port wine (3 rd version)
It takes 10 mg of a particular poison to cause the death of an adult. John dropped 10 mg of poison in the glass of port, which is intended for Mr X. Anthony, independently of John, dropped another 3 mg of the same poison. Subsequently Francis, also independently of the others, again added 10 mg of the same poison. Mr X drank the port, and died consequently.
Again, the agents are as in the first version, and the meaning of basic actions (now p3, p10 and D) and atomic assertions is similar to those in the first version.
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The same strategy allows us to conclude that: i) Set {(p10,j),(p3,a),(p10,f)} explains the death of Mr X ii) Set {(p10,j),(p10,f)} explains the death of Mr X iii) But no other subset of {(p10,j),(p3,a),(p10,f)} could explain the death of Mr X. Thus, in particular, (again) no particular action could by itself explain the death of Mr X.
The difference with respect to the before mentioned case (2 nd version) is that now we find an explication that does not involve the action (p3,a). Does this give grounds for a different proceeding with the attribution of causation?
The alternative heuristic, proposed hereafter seems to give a more solid foundation for an affirmative conclusion.
d) Alternative heuristic
The heuristic we complied with before in these cases of effective concurrence of causes is not the only possible. Our intention is precisely to explore several heuristics, in order to see which (if any) does reflect best the way of deciding the attribution of causation to one agent in particular.
The last version (3 rd version) might be considered: we know that the set {(p10,j),(p3,a),(p10,f)} explains the death of Mr X, actually observed.
Let us look for the smallest subsets that can explain the death of Mr X, as they are described in the following:
First it is checked if any single action, in the absence of the other basic actions,
could explain the death of Mr X. If this is not the case, then we can start on with the analysis of sets of two actions, in order to see if, in the absence of the third basic action, any of these sets could explain the death of Mr X.
To be more concrete: let us consider action (p10,j) and suppose that our trajectory included this basic action, but none of the other. Mr X would have died according to this trajectory (i.e., consider that a trajectory like h4 is our actual trajectory). On an alternative trajectory, where everything is similar, but where John had not dropped poison into the glass of port (like in trajectory h8), Mr X would not have died. Thus (p10,j) explains by itself Mr X death. The cause of Mr X's death can therefore be attributed to the basic action carried out by John.
We come to the same conclusion regarding action (p10,f).
Let us consider now action (p3,a) and, similarly, suppose that our present trajectory included this action, but none of the others (i.e., consider h6 as our actual trajectory). Now, Mr X would not have died on this trajectory, so that, in accordance with our heuristic, no causal nexus between this action and the death of Mr X could be identified.
Hence causation cannot be attributed to Anthony in the third version.
If we consider at this point the second version, we would still find the lack of a causal nexus between each action by itself and the death of Mr X. The smallest sets of actions that explain the death of Mr X are, according to this heuristic:
Thus, in what respect the second version, there is no difference on the results obtained from the application of the two heuristics.
Additional overtaking cause
The cases included in the category of the additional overtaking cause raise difficulties that are comparable to those that are generally associated with the effective concurrency of causes (or contributory causes), which has been analysed before.
Let us analyse the riddle of the death in the desert: John ventured out into the desert.
His survival was guaranteed by excursions to a water reservoir. Anthony poisoned the water reservoir. Francis, who was unaware of Anthony's action, emptied out the reservoir. After a few days John is found dead in the desert 18 .
18 Adaptation of the case conceived by James A. McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, vol. XXXIX, 149(6) Abbreviations in use:
Agents: Observation: moments 3 and 4 should not be represented as one unique moment within the present trajectory h1 (worth to be mentioned, it is the trajectory actually followed), since this would suggest that John would have died immediately after his attempt to drink water (liquids). Yet the situation was not exactly like that, but rather as follows: after a while, the victim eventually died, not having succeeded to provide himself with water.
Available information:
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There is also the information that the assertions ¬dead(j) and res(water) are true at moment h1(0), i.e. there is the information that, at such moment, John is not dead and the reservoir full of drinkable water.
Thus, regardless of John having water or not, in his canteen (water bottle), since he can actually rely on the reservoir full of drinkable water, we can conclude there is drinking water available to John at moment h1(0), i.e. assertion disp(j,water) is also true. And so it is also true that there are liquids at John's disposal. Therefore:
It is further known that at h1(4) the assertion dead_of(j,desid) is true.
Moreover, given that dead_of(j,desid) implies dead(j), the assertion dead(j) is also true, at h1(4).
PROBLEM I: |(P,a,0)  (dead(j),4)| ?
Rendered into natural language, the question is as such: was the dead of John, verified at instant 4, really caused by the fact that Anthony had poured poison in the water reservoir, at instant 0?
Observation: it is given as proven that John was dead at instant 4 and that Anthony poured poison into the reservoir at instant 0.
The relevant alternative trajectory is obtained supposing that, at the initial moment, the agent a does not carry out action P, performing instead other actions not relevant for the case, and that all the other agents act as they did in the current trajectory.
The relevant alternative trajectory is h3.
In accordance with intuitive assumptions about the outcomes of the basic actions considered, the conclusion that, according to this alternative trajectory, the evolution of the state of affairs would be as follows, is legitimate: All in all, the question if |(P,a,0)  (dead(j),4)| will have a negative answer.
If we proceed to a more detailled description of the event ocurred at instant 4, it turns out again that we conclude that there is no causal filiation of |dead of John with signs of dehydration| regarding the introduction of poison into the water reservoir by Anthony.
That is the question if |(P,a,0)  (dead_of(j,desid),4)| will have a negative answer.
Rendering once again into natural language, the question is the following: was the death of John, that occurred at instant 4, really caused by the fact the Francis has emptied out the water reservoir at instant 1?
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The relevant alternative trajectory is now h2.
Observation: here the relevant initial moment is h2(1) and not h2(0). It should also be noted that the transition from h2(0) to h2(1) was accomplished by introducing poison in the water reservoir, and for this reason res(poison) at h2 (1) is a true atomic assertion.
Therefore, on trajectory h2 the following is observed: In sum, the question if |(E,f,1)  (dead(j),4)| has a negative answer.
It becomes clear that, while we do not have committed any mistake in reasoning, it cannot be said that this last conclusion (together with the answers to the previous questions) does conform to our intuitive and empirical representations: it is against the principle of the sufficient reason that something exists without any cause. In fact, according to its current formulation, the principium rationis states that nihil est sine ratione or, according to an also common positive formulation, omne ens habet rationem. All in all, each being has a reason for existence, without exception. So we cannot accept the conclusion that John's death happened without any cause. Nor can we accept, in another version of the same paradox, that the reason for the ocurrence of the victim's death was the circumstance that he was alive before he died.
Perhaps we can evade this conclusion if we call into question the assumption of contemporaneity between the occurrence of John's death at trajectory h2 and his death at h1(4). It is after all reasonable to presume that the poison, if it was in fact ingested by John, would have caused its effect in less time than it takes the process of dehydration to lead to his death. The difference of hours, or maybe days, between the compared occurrences would be sufficient to allow us to affirm that John's death would not have happened the same way if he was actually poisoned, since dying at one moment is not the same as dying at another moment. This time we would give way to the conclusion that after all Francis caused John's death in the moment that (when) he died. In other words, Francis gave a cause to the victim's death. Thus tribut would be paid to the principle of the sufficient reason.
Even more important than the verification of different moments of John's death in the several stories is the fact that emptying the reservoir implies a delay on the trajectory actually followed as compared to the death due to a hypothetic intoxication.
As death is the unavoidable destiny of any living creature, it seems that causing death to somebody has to be defined as shortening someones life, considering for that purpose that some signs of the cause may be visible in the object-effect itself, discording with David Hume. For example, if we were looking at a piece of paper, it will be easy to recognize the signs of a cutting tool. As a matter of fact, forensic medicine does nothing but searching for signs of inflicted aggressions in the human body. But David Hume himself would almost be willing to agree with us, and would only rectify us by means of the objection that what we really see are not the signs of the cause in the object-effect, but the repetition of aspects we have become familiar to see in those objects similar to the effect, which always followed the objects similar to the cause. We must admit that it makes no difference if we comprehend the signs impressed on the object-effect one way or the other, as long as we accept that there are visible signs and that we can refer to them in the rigorous description of the event's aspect. The rigour applied to this description should preserve the autonomy of the event in relation to any foretelling of causation. After all, the anomalous aspects of the event not always are result of the cause in quest (for example the first sign that appears during a first inspection of a corpse may be a cranial contusion, which would lead the observer to suppose a stroke to the head as being the cause of death; however, the forensic experts add chemical and medical facts obtained through toxicological analysis of the guts that reveal the presence of vegetal alkaloids; this proves, in combination with the examination of all anatomical and pathological signs, poisoning as a cause and contradicts the initial suspicion of mechanical aggression being the cause of death). In other words, the description of the event should mention all the anomalous aspects of the event. This gives support to the idea that the appearance of the event should not be mistaken for the mode of its occurrence, as there are misleading signs. But one thing is sure: if no signs were found in the object-effect that lead to think of a certain cause and also other probatory elements that could point to it were nonexistent (for example the testimony that John had drunk from the poisoned water), then the conclusion that this was the cause of the victim's death would at the very least be unfounded. Moreover, it would be as unfounded as a potential conclusion that the victim died because of a scorpion's sting or any other cause.
In the present hypothesis we are used to the ordinary causal generalisation that the poison as well as dehydration cause death (and this is enough: there is no need to emulate the experts with their scientific explications), and we presumed that it is possible to discover, in each of the possible trajectories that led to John's death, if his corpse contained vegetal alkaloids or if he only showed signs of dehydration. In sum we have the necessary and sufficient information in order to resolve the case, and therefore we may simply question if the introduction of poison into the water reservoir or, alternatively, the its depletion were the cause of the death -on the actually followed trajectory -of that victim, which showed signs of dehydration, but did not reveal the existence of any alkaloid. So let us follow this path.
PROBLEM IV: |(E,f,1)  (dead_of(j,desid),4)| ?
In natural language, is it worth to ask if the |dead with signs of dehydration| of John that was observerd at instant 4 was really caused by the fact that Francis had emptied the water reservoir at instant 1?
The relevant alternative trajectory is still h2. And (as we have seen) we have the John died of dehydration -it is appropriate to put it that way now -and it was Francis who killed him.
The conclusion is now clear and convincing.
The philosopher Mackie came exactly to the same conclusion, as we can see in the following quote:
"If the can had not been punctured, the traveller would have died of poison, perhaps even sooner than he actually died of thirst; but if it had not been poisoned, he would have died just as and when he did" 22 .
Concluding Remarks
Causation as an element of a criminal offence is different from the probative difficulties. The empirical laws that are relevant to the proof of causation, as a pure matter of fact, are not discussed here, but only causality as a category of our understanding and a general law of the intelligible world. This general law of causality is equally valid for all result crimes (e.g. homicide, bodily harm, deception offences and criminal damage). According to the European continental theory of conditions, any conditio sine qua non is by itself a cause. Causation is established by the formula of conditio (similar to the so-called 'but for' test in the common law), which corresponds to a counterfactual reasoning. However, that formula is not able to resolve adequately those cases of causal overdetermination where the result occurred by means of actions of multiple, independently intervening agents. A semantic model of the world evolution, similar to those considered in some ramified temporal logics, but more informal, may assist the comprehension of causal connections between human actions and the relevant results. At the end of the day, this model allows us to understand that, even in situations where no kind of factual uncertainty is present, doubts upon the attribution of causation to specific agents remain. We shall conclude that the attribution of causation is not a natural problem, but a logico-legal one, that has to be dealt with by way of logico-legal criteria. Nevertheless, attribution of causation must be clearly distinguished from objective imputation of proscribed harm.
